7 martie 2011

Cyber-kids – Life-styles and character

Abstract

The Internet provides a different way of being-in-the-world. The ontological status of children today has changed and, consequently, they have to respond to a new challenge in their development. This change, in turn, creates new challenges for the society. In the first part of my article, I will point out that the image of the child used nowadays is a creation of the modern era and answers modern needs. The modern image is a result of a particular system of schooling, of transmitting created information. However, in a knowledge networking society, this system fails us and it should be replaced by a system that considers the child an actor equally important to the teacher in the educational process. The second part of the article analyses the characteristics of digital self-presentation made by children who believe that on-line identity is a ‘construct’ done by assembling items of life-style. Moreover, these assemblages take violent and shocking forms because of new media characteristics. In conclusion, I stress the need of character development as a response to possible personality disorders that accompanies the on-line loss of self in multi-media assembled selves.




A history of “childhood”

A study of childhood is based on the premise of the existence of a distinct, well-defined category of childhood. The first part of my article deals with this essentialist definition and with the contemporary criticism of it, in an attempt to re-evaluate the status of the child in the new media culture. Criticisms of authority, essentialist, and pyramidal-structured society during the mid-twentieth century claim a new approach regarding children, an approach precipitated by the rise of Internet, a general-purpose network and environment for games, creative expression, art, film and photography that allows individuals away from traditional structures to communicate, share and perform joint activities over computers.

“Childhood” is not a biological category. The term applies broadly to the stage of human development between infancy and adulthood. This category was constructed along with many other social categories and institutions at the beginning of modernity. This invention is contemporary with other separations and differences, like madness, clinic and prison as analysed by Foucault1, in the beginning of modernity as the way of establishing the essence of rational, white, adult man. Speaking and dealing with childhood today is indebted on the one hand to the discourses which separate childhood as an ontological category and on the other hand to anti-enlightenment positions that try to re-evaluate modern differences and to recognise the right of suppressed categories to speak for themselves.

It is only starting with the sixteenth century that children have had a different human condition than adults. As Philippe Aries, a French historian, shows by examining medieval works of art and school records, before the seventeenth century children were represented as mini-adults. The modern quest for an essence of human being isolated the child as an inferior category, a human being in spe, with no other purpose than that of being educated to become a full human being. According to this view, the child is not fully human and has characteristics that do not qualify him for an adult. Children are sexless, genderless, have no responsibility. They are to be protected or taught to behave. Children are either angelic creatures that do not tell good from evil and are powerless in front of society evils, or diabolic creatures, that must be limited in their actions until they learn the social norms.

Both approaches are based on the assumption that the child is incapable to relate appropriately in society. Contrary to this modern, “enlightened” position, Holloway shows that in fact adults also fail to qualify for the essence of adulthood:

‘The so-called hallmarks of adulthood: maturity, rationality, social competence, knowledge and so on are just as readily performed by a child as a grown-up. Likewise, adults can sometimes demonstrate naivety, gullibility and other less reasoned responses that are usually ascribed to children. Emotional and social competence is not therefore a stable attribute of a particular age but rather is a fluid, context-dependent performance that can be staged by children and adults alike.’ (Holloway, 2003, 95)

In fact, adults and children alike have their own contextual way of emotional and social competence.

Children and Education

The conception regarding the immaturity2 of a child gave birth to the identification of childhood with the educational stage of life, schooling. The child should receive the proper education in order to acquire the adult, mature stage. The considerations of the schooling process should emphasize the three stages needed to become a member of society: traditional, modern and contemporary. This threefold split corresponds to Sloterdijk's conception, which classifies communities in closed traditional ones, national-state communities and the open community of global village. To become a member of society means to develop the appropriate character, to acquire the relevant skills and to occupy the relevant place in society3.

In a traditional society, this process is partially predetermined by the conditions of birth. Usually one cannot transcend one's condition. In addition, the roles and skills in a traditional society are learned by doing and being a limited choice, a system for educating one as a member of society is unnecessary. The community is closed and there is only one way of doing things, not because it is impossible to do otherwise but because experimentation is a practice not accepted by traditional society. Speaking of techniques, Jacques Ellul shows that the medieval man prefers to improve its own capacities to do things with the existing technology rather than to change the way of doing, by inventing new technologies.

‘There was no great variety of means for attaining a desired result, and there was almost no attempt to perfect the means which did exist. ... Man tended to exploit to the limit such means as he possessed, and took care not to replace them or to create other means as long as the old ones were effective.’ (Ellul, 1965, 67)

The traditional image is changed by the modern ideology of “the best way,” as Ellul puts it. Therefore, there is a universal reason that everyone should follow and there is one best human being: the white adult man. As a result, children are raised into this image of the rational perfection and a unique way to pursue it. The modern national state requires the fulfilment of a never-ending project of construction of the perfect man and the perfect state. Modernity imposes an image, an essence of man that requires a system of education to instruct citizens into their roles. To sum up, education can no longer be left in the hands of individuals; society should try to respect one universal curriculum that will transform the raw human material (people) into modern citizens. The modern system in use today fails in a global society as the options have increased manifold, we can no longer aim for an essence to be learnt by everybody.

Modern schooling system

The schooling system is criticized by Illich as missing both its educational purpose and its informational process.

‘But if schools are the wrong places for learning a skill, they are even worse places for getting an education. School does both tasks badly, partly because it does not distinguish between them. School is inefficient in skill instruction especially because it is curricular. In most schools a program, which is meant to improve one skill, is always chained to another irrelevant task. History is tied to advancement in math, and class attendance to the right to use the playground.’ (Illich, 1971, 17)

The teacher is the supreme authority in the classroom who knows everything and the child is a raw material who should be informed/ created. On the one hand, the child should not have their own voice or thoughts, just to reproduce without knowing why, any information provided by the teachers. Reproducing the information gives the child no skills, no proper ways to deal with reality. On the other hand, the schooling environment is not educational, it does not develop a character in child, the habitual action as Aristotle calls it, because the teacher addresses the pupil with authority, as representing the system and the knowledge.

Baudrillard, Lyotard, and other post-modern thinkers see this transformation in the ontology of childhood as a result of the dissolution of paper-based written culture, a linear and authoritative culture that established the rule of one rational way of doing things. The authorities, as parent and teacher are rationally constructed, are to be criticised on this rational model. The constructed relationships by means of a written linear culture are in crisis because of the new media that takes the place of parents and teachers in a pluralistic, non-linear, and anti-authoritative way. Roger Fidler says in Mediamorphosis. Understanding New Media: “for little children, the television became a 'machine for revealing secrets'. [...] The television, especially after 1960, totally undermined this system and contributed to the dissolution of adult authority.” (Fidler, 2004, 103).

On the other hand, this independence of children regarding old authorities is accompanied by a similar independence of the parents who prefer to leave the education of their children to the hands of state education and live their lives in a society of endless consumption. As Baudrillard puts it, “the parents are those who liberate themselves from children.” (Baudrillard, 2001, 48) By breaking the necessary relationships of education between child and parent, pupil and teacher, the education, primarily that of child (that in modern times was realised at school and at home and only at home in traditional societies) has become an impersonal education.

Parents are too busy and want to liberate themselves for consumption while teachers become a simple formal entity with no power or authority. Therefore, the humanistic education, which is nevertheless a form of violence for Lyotard4, is transformed in the assemblage of pieces of networked education that surpasses and dismisses the limits imposed by a linear system of formation. Nevertheless, we cannot accept the McLuhan conception, or that of Illich, that networked and new media education will save us and will represent a revival of traditional and more natural way of being. On the one hand, there is no way back to the traditional society because the 'global village' is constructed by concatenation of (post)-modern metropolis. The 'global village' does not have the ethics of a village, and the modern ethics, in the form of Kantian categorical imperative, is being dismissed as irrelevant today.

On the other hand, there is no '(more) natural' way of doing things. The 'natural way' is just one of the interpretations of the modern 'best way'. The new media is not closer to human nature. As Hannah Arendt puts it, there is at best just a human condition but there cannot be a human eternal essence. Therefore, new media can at least better fulfil the contemporary needs of humans. The criticism of essence, (of a supposed essence of childhood in our case) determines a new image of children. They are no longer humans in spe, but full humans with rights, responsibilities, and the right to affirm their own culture. The childhood is no more a transitory period of life but a meaningful existence per se. As different from adults – because of modernity – children find in the new media the means to express themselves, to acquire a new ontological status. Sonia Livingston points out four characteristics by which this new media contributes to reshaping the childhood:

1. Multiplication of personally owned media, encouraging the privatization of media use.

2. Diversifying media and media content, facilitating wider trends towards individualisation.

3. Convergence of traditional media, resulting in a blur of traditionally distinct boundaries.

4. Expansion of interactive media, resulting in the transformation of a mass audience into an active anonymous and larger group of participatory users. (Holloway and Valentine, 2003)

The child becomes an owner of very powerful tools, like computers and mobile telephones, the gates of access to a world designed for autonomous modern adults. Children can no more be isolated because the Internet is open and free with all its goods and evils. Computers, that children are more literate in than their parents, are the tools by which the world is managed by adults as well as by children nowadays. Whereas there used to be a specific time and space of childhood, delimited by the modern assignation of essences, now the children occupy the same cyberspace without even the possibility of identification of the (mis)use.

The effects of this access are growing geometrically as the number of media and media contents is increasing indefinitely. Children do not have access to a 'modern' world of adults but to a different world (even so for modern adults themselves), a world build by negotiations in which children take part as well. They access a multitude of worlds in which there is no pre-established path. Each user can, and is obliged, to construct in its own way. However, a process of convergence of all media occurs, a bringing together, a Heideggerian Gestalt, which makes possible the creation of virtual objects and personas constantly reshaped.

In addition, the last process mentioned by Sonia Livingston, but certainly not the least, is the interactivity of this digital realm. This interactivity is like the Cinderella of the digital world. The first computer networks, Arpanet and Minitel, were not intended to be interactive. As conceived by its creators, they were just systems of network distribution of information. The possibility of interaction in the form of infotainment between users was considered initially a misuse of the network but it became the mainstream of the Internet. Given the tremendous power of today’s new media, forms of interactivity change to the point that forms of real-life world interactions do not easily apply to the Internet and mobile phone usage as well.

As we have seen so far, the image of child constructed from the seventeen century onwards, does no longer correspond to the realities brought about by new media. The current educational system seems to be ‘based on wrong premises’ from a contemporary point of view. If modern education was effective in creating the modern man, it fails to answer contemporary challenges. The child is exposed to an infinite amount of information; therefore, a school system based on the transmission of information is simply out of date. Nevertheless, the complexity of contemporary society is more than ever in need of education, an education capable to respond the necessities of our 'brave new world'. This need for education is apparent if we consider the development of adult education in recent years and in the large amount of requalification by many.

A new paradigm of teaching

What Ivan Illich puts as the development of skills following personal choices, I will consider in the next part of my article from the point of view of character development and the assemblage of lifestyles.

At the end of this section, I will consider two images of classroom that can show the characteristics of a new approach to education. Both classrooms are actually implemented. The first is a traditional classroom and the second is an IT classroom. What is peculiar to these IT classrooms is that they were not intended to be so, but the specific of content and material circumstances bring about a new model.

The traditional classroom is based on a pyramidal model in which teacher represents the authority, the keeper of information, of secrets that he transmits to pupils. The only role of pupils is to listen, learn, and reproduce that information. They are simply seen as tabula rasa to be written on. The channel of communication is one-to-many, because only the voice of teacher is allowed to be heard, so when a pupil speaks, it is to reproduce what the teacher says, any other behaviour being considered either a wrong answer or indiscipline.

The IT classroom model is lot more different. To emphasize this shift I will use a quote from Sarah Holloway and Gill Valentine's Cyber-kids. Children in the Information Age; it analyses the specific geography of some IT classrooms in Great Britain, characteristics that are also present in a large majority of IT classrooms around the globe as well.

‘Perhaps one of the most noticeable aspects of the ICT lessons we observed in the case-study schools was their relatively relaxed atmosphere (Schofield 1997, 35). A research review of computers and classroom social processes, points to a number of studies. (For examples, see Chaiklin and Lewis, 1988; Davidson and Richie 1994; O'Connor and Brie, 1994; Schofield, 1995). Suggest that the introduction of computers into the classroom tends to be associated with “a shift in teachers' roles away from didactic whole class instruction towards more individualised and student-centred interaction.” [...] Children found ICT lessons more relaxed than other classes despite the fact many would eventually gain an educational qualification in the subject. This is because of the level of autonomy children have in relation to their learning. Pupils at Highfields, for example, described how their work in other lessons is strictly controlled by the teachers, and they are required to concentrate for long periods, listening to teachers, taking notes from the blackboard, or working from books. In ITC lessons by contrast, the pupils are taught as a group when a new task that will take several lessons to complete is introduced, but are then allowed working through this at their own pace soliciting help from the teacher as and when required. [...] This informality is emphasised for those pupils who are good at IT and therefore find the lessons less demanding. Though differences in ability are evident in all classes, they are more emphasised in those, which are not streamed by ability. Here, the brighter pupils can handle the work with ease and are left with time to themselves. Identified as one of the benefits of learning with computers, the relaxed classroom atmosphere that such student-centred teaching encourage, also have other implications. Most notably, social relations between children are more evident here than in strictly controlled classrooms where adult-child power relations are often more important. The IT lesson is thus a space within the school where teacher practice means pupil culture can come to dominate.’ (Holloway and Valentine, 2003, 49-50)

In conclusion, I emphasise on the characteristics of IT classrooms in opposition with traditional classrooms mentioned above. The IT classroom is based on a network model in which teacher does not represent the authority, but only a more informed peer. The role of pupils is to discover, to ask, and communicate in order to develop their paths in acquiring the skills of computer programming. The children are peers in a game of development. The channel of communication is many-to-many, because teacher and colleagues play the same role in class interactions. When a pupil speaks, he speaks his own voice, his own understanding of IT. That is more unexpected if we take into consideration that IT is a discipline as strict and as logical as maths. However, one important aspect that should be emphasised is the presence of the computer that is not only a tool but also an actant. Following the Actor-Network Theory of Bruno Latour (Latour, 2005), we should say that the computer is an actor as important as the teacher and pupils in IT classrooms. The geography of the classroom is dictated by the computer: pupils should look not at teacher but at computer and the class is formed by little groups. The computer is the first interlocutor of the child. To paraphrase a Heideggerian metaphor, which said that the voice of the master creates a classroom, here the IT, the computer is what brings together the actants. What is also very important is that in IT classrooms pupils do not reproduce what teacher said but they create and develop skills, they take part at and modify the classroom, they become active. These characteristics are emphasized in The Network Society by Jan van Dijk, in the chapter entitled “Psychology”, where he presents five opportunities of education in the new media age:

“1. Students will be able to manipulate subject matter themselves. The order, the speed, and even the complete contents do not have to be determined in advance. [...]

2. Making use of the many choices available in multimedia course material, students are able to learn by exploring and experimenting in open environments. [...]

3. Students may choose from several types of presentation, each with the same content. [...]

4. Course material used in multimedia education is extremely suitable for visualising, modelling, and simulating information. 'Playing' with this material proves to be a very valuable experience. [...]

5. Finally, interactivity enables the student to start a direct dialogue with a program in a device. This combination of hardware and software is called 'intelligent'. Students receive direct feedback and immediately know what they are doing wrong.” (van Dijk, 1999, 205)

Such, the process of education should become a form of entertainment. The new media culture makes a shift in the way of perceiving and experiencing the reality5.

The transformation of the schooling system as a whole into a new model is hard to acquire because teacher are not digital natives and they lack IT knowledge and skills that pupils are experts at. Indeed, teachers’ modern authority is destroyed in the new framework of the classroom but this is effectively how the things should work in order to develop pupils’ autonomous personalities, to let them speak, create and discover.


Cyber-kids

We have seen so far how the image of a child is being actively changed by a new media culture and how this, in turn, affects the current educational system. We focussed first on the schooling system because of two reasons. First, the powerful link created by modern culture between childhood and schooling has the consequence that the criticism and the research of children were mainly directed to school environment. Second, giving the fact observed by Baudrillard that parents tend to liberate themselves from children and the growing amount of time that children spend in new media environment (Internet, television, mobile phones), we can state that only two entities educate a child, school and new media. We now proceed to analyse the relation between children and new media from the perspective of how they live the networked virtual world.

First, let us clarify the term 'cyber-kid' used in our article. In 1985, Donna Haraway published the essay A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century in "Simians, Cyborgs, and Women". There she introduced the term cyborg to designate the ontological status of technologically transformed human beings.

‘A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. [...] By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorised and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are ‘cyborgs’. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of not only imagination but also material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation.’ (Haraway, 1991, 49-50)

In our terms, the cyborg is the entity constructed through virtual networks. It does not have to be physically modified by technology. It is enough that nowadays our world is technologically orientated. Technology comprises digital technology, i.e. the Internet and mobile phones. We are hybrid beings constructed by a new understanding of being. To be connected means to understand differently our existence. In addition, our actions become mainly digital, virtual actions. The image of self is digitally constructed. The man with a computer connected to Internet or with a mobile phone is a different kind of being. The Heideggerian being-in-the-world has changed to a digital insertion in the networks. Therefore, we should reconsider the way children have to be conceptualized in a different way, especially because nowadays children are born in a technologically embodied world. They are digitally native. They are cyber-kids by birth.

Self-creation: One of the main characteristics that the digital realm exhibits is the necessity of self-presentation. On every social network site the child is obliged, by the structure of the site itself, to create his/her own image. Alternatively, to put it better, to re-create an identity. There are predefined tools, like avatars, layouts, fields to be filled in, that allow the child to choose an identity. Based on those choices a community is also instantiated, the links are automatically created. If the specific identity is more or less one's choice, the network dictates the patterns of construction. The structure of network is like birth characteristics that one cannot change. Each person receives a partial structure of himself or herself when they sign up. Moreover, if one does not choose an option, that field will receive a default value. As a result, the network itself is co-constituent of one's identity.

Multiple instantiation: But the construction of the self is not linear and differs from one environment to another. To construe an identity in Second Life differs from constructing an identity on hi5 or Yahoo Messenger. Each of them requires different information, different types of content. However, each of them requires a certain creation, a self-definition. In addition, the specific aim for connecting to a certain network requires the construction of an avatar with certain characteristics. One presents herself in a certain way on a date-site and in a different way on a forum concerned with cars. These identities could conflict with each other, and certainly they are not identical. Moreover, these multiple and different instantiations of users may be dealt with at the same time, shifting from one another. This process contributes to the fact that identity on the Internet (but with real-life consequence) becomes floating, unstable.

Self-experimentation: Generally, teenagers are inclined to self-experimentation. Digital media enhances this characteristic. The new media culture put a high value on being different and on self-experimenting. The multiplication of media correlates with a multiplication of modes of expression that are not only possible but become real. What is technologically possible is or will be instantiated. This need for experimentation seen in children produces content that blurs the limits and shock. For Heidegger, this need for experience of contemporary world is a consequence of nihilism and de-valorisation. If there are no new universal values to follow then we will be left with ceaseless experimentation.


Construction of life-style

In 1984, Albert Borgmann analysed the character of contemporary technology and presented the ubiquity of assemblage, a phenomena taking place in all domains of technological life. The reality is itemised, decomposed in its smallest constituting elements in order to reassemble them in products following the logic of technology assemblage. The logic of assemblage functions at every stage as the principle of deriving an indefinite number of products from some basic items. This itemised restructuring, the de-composition of basic elements, is accompanied by de-contextualisation. Elements should be extracted from their context to become pure elements for furthering life’s production line. Life-style is constructed in the same manner.

The only value of these items of life-style is their assemblage value, their capacity to be included in any other construction.

‘But when the supporting structure of daily life assumes the character of machinery that is concealed and separated from the commodities it procures and when these become isolated and mobile, then it becomes possible to style and restyle one's life by assembling and disassembling commodities. Life becomes positively ambiguous.’ (Borgmann, 1987, 92)

Life itself becomes a commodity. The identity online is an assembled identity. The child is confronted with a large variety of items of life-style that she has to assemble in order to construct her identity. Moreover, is it a matter of only one identity or of the stabilization of identities? The many identities she can, and should, assume are, and should be, constantly reshaped. The reshaping is not a matter of getting closer to the real self, but of creating a multitude of selves. This may result in the development of capacities of expression and of one's personality, but also in the loss of one's personality in the multitude of life-styles she assumes. “At best the increase of opportunities for information and communication will contribute to a universally developed personality.” (van Dijk, 1999, 216). However, if one cannot manage the digital assemblage, there can be also personality disorders. Jan van Dijk proposes four related personality types. First, there is the rigid or formalistic personality, people who cannot relate to others in a normal way but only as they relate with computers or other media. Then, there is a computerised personality, who perceives others as just another type of computer. The unsocial personality tends to relate only by means of computers as a safer environment, Finally, there is the multiple personality, whose roles played online surpass one's personality to such an extent that she is only those roles and nothing more.

The assemblage of lifestyles brings us to the problem of character. As Internet provides all necessary information, it also provides the necessary items to self-construction. Moreover, the new media culture is stringent in asking repeatedly for redefinitions of oneself. The Internet does not provide only information but also items of lifestyles as commodities in order for the consumer to construct herself. However, this eternal reconstruction becomes schizophrenia or paranoia unless there is a critical appropriation of those new media. For developing a character, one has to have one. This is true for technology and humans as well. Their characters shape each other in interaction. The problem with character is that one cannot acquire one if one does not have one yet.

‘Metaphysically, character is neither essence nor accident. Epistemologically, character is neither conceived nor perceived. Anthropologically, character is neither determination nor freedom. Character is a reality always in-between, “Neither universal essence nor particular accident, a limited determination and an equally limited freedom. In it lies the heart of the human condition.’ (Mitcham 2000, 133).

Similar to knowledge, which is not a summing up of the amount of items of information, the amount of items of life-style does not sum up in character. Aristotle defines character as produced by nature and habit. If one cannot form these habits, if one loses herself in the multitude of the selves assumed on the Internet, then the Internet becomes a weapon of self-destruction rather than a tool for self-creation. To be on the Internet means to create selves and communities by assembling items of lifestyle. The Internet requires the never-ending reshaping of oneself(s). Users' characters and the way the Internet looks like depend on each other because, as Bruno Latour shows in his Actor-Network Theory, humans and artefacts act together and shape each other. On the one hand, the particular path through the network shapes one's character. On the other hand, to create self(s) and communities and digital objects (software, content) means to build the character of the Internet. Children, in this case, are the first victims if they do not have the necessary tools to develop a character, to create a meaningful use of Internet.


Shocking identities

I will analyse now an example of children-produced content in order to extract some more characteristics of cyber-kids. The material is one of many homemade videos produced by teenagers that lift the skirts of unknown women on street. The videos posted on Youtube of gratuitous antisocial acts are neither a use nor an abuse of the network but an act induced by the specific disposition of contemporary technology. These acts were absurd if there were no record and no network to post the content. The record alone is not enough, because the posting part is more important. The academic 'publish or perish' is assimilated by Internet in the form of 'either post or do not exist'. Moreover, the content of every post should be shocking because of the immense availability of tremendously various contents on the Internet to the extent that things become very insignificant. The trifling nature of things and people in new media is the cause of the violent character of such posts. The other is perceived through media, the other is just an image. This behaviour of recording antisocial performances is also a consequence of candid camera shows. Nevertheless, there are many differences between candid camera and these videos. In candid camera shows, the focus is on the embarrassment of people in strange situations. In addition, there are ethical limits in the case of television. However, the children that created this type of content act as if others are media creations as well and the violence is purely experimental in character. These videos are centred only on shocking acts. These videos are not some extreme form of manifestation in new media but a normal characteristic.

Even the self-presentation of children is shocking. To post is to post something different. The children create exhibiting selves on Internet. Privacy and intimacy are understood in a different manner. First, it is because on-line relationships are unstable in the first stages. Consequently, the information given in on-line interactions presume a violent language, shocking content, lies as well as intimate things. The identity assumed online nevertheless has consequences for the real identity of children. They also construct themselves in real life as virtual identities. To be an Internet native means to see the real world as a continuation of the virtual world and not the other way around as older generations do. The categories of self-presentation for children in real world are therefore different and follow online patterns. This brings again the problem of character, of developing children’s personalities. Therefore, more than ever, education has become utterly important. Children should receive the tools for consistent self-creation because the Internet tends to dissipate the personality. Even if the Internet can provide the tools for exceptional self-expression, it does not encourage it. This education should not assume the inferiority of children but should take the children as partners in projects of consistent development in on-line environments because, as we have seen, the traditional school pattern is unproductive in educating children because of its false premises.

Bibliography:

Benjamin, Walter (1998). The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm.

Borgmann, Albert (1987). Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. The University of Chicago Press.

Ellul, Jacques. (1965). The Technological Society. Alfred A. Knopf.

Fidler, Roger (2004). Mediamorphosis. Idea Design & Print.

Haraway, Donna J. (1991). Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. Routledge.

Heidegger, Martin (1993). Basic Writings. Routledge.

Holloway, Sarah L. and Valentine, Gill (2003). Cyberkids. Children in the information age. Routledge.

Illich, Ivan (1971). Deschooling Society. http://www.preservenet.com/theory/Illich/Deschooling/intro.html

Latour, Bruno (2005). Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford University Press.

Lyotard, J.-F. (2002). Inumanul. Idea Design & Print.

Mitcham, Carl (2000). On Character and Technology. In Higs, Erric and al. (eds.). Technology and the Good Life?. The University of Chicago Press, pp. 126-148.

van Dijk, Jan (1999). The Network Society: Social Aspects of New Media. Sage.

1 See M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception or Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

2Maturity and childhood are complementary concepts and questioning one of them undermines the other too. Maturity as opposed to childishness is a way to behave regardless of age.

3These categories are to be considered as ideal types, which tend to be predominant in a society or in certain domains. For example, medieval society had a schooling system that transformed the natural pagan into the Christian man. But at the level of schooling, there was no consideration of child as inferior to adult. “ Until the Second Vatican Council, each child was instructed that a Christian reaches moral discernment and freedom at the age of seven” (Illich, 1971, 26)

4 „Every education is inhumane because it cannot succeed without coercion and terror, and I think about the least controlled education, the least pedagogical one, that which Freud calls castration and make him say, related to 'good methods' of raising children, that anyway thing go from bad to worse” (Lyotard, 2002, 8)

5 “The distracted person, too, can form habits. […] Reception in a state of distraction, which is increasing noticeably in all fields of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds in the film its true means of exercise. The film with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one.” (Benjamin, 1998)

Virusul, codul şi pornografia

Kant şi Freud au găsit că marea cultură se creează printr-o sublimă sublimare. Marea artă este sublimă pentru că nu poate fi prinsă în concepte, transcende mediocritatea de zi cu zi. Şi, pentru a ajunge la ea, are loc procesul de sublimare prin care impulsurile/instictele vitale sunt refulate şi sublimate. În lipsa sublimării, spune Freud, apar comportamentele patologice. Ceea ce nu au observat cei doi este procesul, omniprezent astăzi, de neg-sublimare (după neg-entropia din fizică; a nu se confunda cu anti-sublimarea) şi produsul său, maneaua. Genul proxim al manelei este pornografia, produs incultural mult mai larg răspândit pe mapamond.

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Acum câţiva ani citeam un articol de Umberto Eco care mi s-a parut extrem de hilar: “Cum să recunoaştem un film porno”. Oricât de neiniţiat ar putea fi cineva, tot ar recunoaşte un film porno. Aşa credeam până de curând, când am fost bombardat de cateva producţii „culturale”, care, dacă nu se conformau definiţiei pe care eu o dădeam pornografiei, în schimb satisfăceau pe deplin condiţiile impuse de Eco. Adică, acţiunea filmului, cum ar fi aşteptarea unui tramvai, elementele de decor sau anumite cadre sunt suprasaturat evidenţiate. Asta pentru că filmul nu transmite nimic dar trebuie să arate totuşi ceva. Cele două ore ale unui film trebuie umplute cu ceva: reluări din diferite poziţii, mişcare încetinită şi, întâi de toate, zoom-area anumitor scene. Filmele la care mă refer aici sunt „Patimile lui Christos” şi „Codul lui da Vinci”, ambele fără nici o valoare estetică, create în cel mai pur stil holywoodian. Primul, un „film de bătaie” á la Rocky, al doilea, un jalnic film poliţist. De fapt, aceste filme nu sunt excepţii de la vreo regulă, ci consecinţele unei vechi dezbateri teologice, cea dintre iconoduli şi iconoclaşti. La al Şaptelea Sinod Ecumenic, Niceea 787, se statuează venerarea imaginilor sfinte. Dar nu numai icoanele au beneficiat de acest sinod, ci întrega artă reprezentativă. Consecinţa postmodernă a artei reprezentative este pornografia, adică arătarea totală: nimic nu mai este ascuns. Ca urmare, una din ultimele imagini din „Patimile lui Christos” este o imagine erotică după toate standardele: un corp gol de bărbat care se ridică din poziţia şezând, filmat din profil. Asta ar fi cireaşa de pe tortul pe care ni l-a oferit Mel Gibson, în care scenele de tortură sunt filmate cu o insistenţă pornografică. Până la a arăta virilitatea întemeietorului creştinismului, povestită de altfel de către Dan Brown, nu mai este decât un pas. Sau un nou sezon holywoodian. Aceeaşi senzaţie de pornografie o trezeşte şi „Codul lui da Vinci”, atât cartea cât şi filmul, prin faptul că este suprasaturat de clişee şi locuri comune, iar acţiunea poliţistă, brodată pe lângă acest deluviu de simboluri care nu mai simbolizează nimic, nu satisface nici măcar standardele romanelor de duzină. Cele două părţi ale Codului, cea poliţistă şi legenda Gralului, se potrivesc perfect unui bun banc despre G.W. Bush, în care medicul îi spune: „Your brain has two parts: a Left one and a Right one. In the Left one, there is nothing right, and in the Right one, there is nothing left”.

Dar similitudinile dintre cele două producţii nu se opresc aici. Al doilea element pe care îşi bazează popularitatea este cel religios. Se prea poate ca acesta să fie modul în care religiozitatea contemporană să îşi facă simţită prezenţa: suprasaturarea şi jocul liber cu vechi simboluri. Şi într-adevăr, „Codul” şi „Patimile” ar fi religioase, dacă nu ar aparţine contemporaneităţii. Pentru cei care încă nu au deprins citirea ironică a textelor postmoderne, „Codul” este o erezie, iar „Patimile” o capodoperă a creştinătăţii. Ele par a pune la încercare credinţa, dar în fapt nu au nici o legătură cu aceasta. Decât poate aceea că Biserica a devenit agent publicitar pentru producţiile pornografice ale Sfintei Păduri (Holy Wood). Nu credinţa este cea interogată aici, ci situarea actuală a simbolului religios, un produs vandabil al societăţii consumeriste. Atât „Codul” cât şi „Patimile” ţin de o modă (in-)culturală, manelismul; sunt filme de sezon care se adresează structurilor imaginarului colectiv contemporan, erodându-le pe acestea. Nu se pun întrebări şi nici nu se oferă răspunsuri. Nimic nou nu transpare prin îngrămădirea de simboluri creştine sau exhaustivitatea modurilor romane de tortură din primul secol al erei noastre. Creştinismul, în acest caz, este doar structura de putere care contribuie la distribuirea în masă a acestor producţii. El se află în aceeaşi poziţie cu Windows-ul care, prin poziţia de monopol al pieţei sistemelor de operare, este principalul vehicul al virusurilor informatice.

Şi, într-adevăr, „Codul” şi „Patimile” acţionează ca un anumit soi de viruşi: aceia care reduplică o informaţie inutilă până la umplerea hard-ului. În acest caz, „Codul” are de departe întâietate. Nu doar a umplut librăriile şi cinematografele, dar a dat naştere la cele mai bizare versiuni ale sale. De la „Gay Vinci Code”, orientarea sexuală a lui Leonardo fiind un picuţ incertă, şi până la interpretări ale interpretărilor simbolurilor din carte, care oricum nu mai aveau nevoie de interpretare. Este adevărat însă că virusurile nu sunt neaparat ceva rău. Ele pot evidenţia erori de sistem, pe care este bine să le corectăm. Sau pot elimina direct astfel de erori de sistem, cum s-a întâmplat cu binevenitul virus antimanele care ştergea toate fişierele audio ce conţineau în titlu numele corifeilor manelelor româneşti. Eu încă nu am găsit partea bună a virusurilor „Codul” şi „Patimile”, dar poate că există. De exemplu, popularizarea operelor lui da Vinci, nu că acestea ar fi avut nevoie de publicitate. Sau, pentru a duce teoria conspiraţiei până la capăt, aşa cum ne sugerează romanul lui Dan Brown, ne putem gândi că există viruşi creaţi de companiile de antiviruşi pentru a-şi vinde mai bine produsele. Şi în acest caz, „Codul” probabil că a fost comandat de Biserică pentru a-şi vinde mai bine indulgenţele credincioşilor care au călcat strâmb şi au vizionat „blestematul” de „Cod”. Ori, chiar Brown o fi fost plătit pentru roman de Opus Dei cu celebra valiză cu obligaţiuni ale Vaticanului despre care se vorbeşte în carte. Căci, la urma urmei, existenţa acestei divizii a Bisericii Catolice, Opus Dei, a fost singurul element pe care nu îl cunoştea toată lumea înainte de a fi citit cartea.

Şi, în final, o ultimă întrebare: Dar cu Leonardo ce-aţi avut?

The Ethics of Technological Design and Practice. A Post-phenomenological and Grammatical Approach (parts)


Key words: technology, ethics, postphenomenology, fundamental grammar

Abstract. The ethics of technology deals with the moral grounds of creating and using devices and technological systems. This paper deals with the ethics of technology from the point of view of postphenomenology – by analysing multistability, mediation and technological intentionality – and of Wittgenstein’s fundamental grammar – by analysing technology as a rule-governed practice. Using these theoretical frameworks, this paper is able to offer a description of the way ethical values are embedded in technology and to present the foundation for a normative ethics of technology.



Using tools is one of the specific characteristics of humans. In order to discuss in moral terms about technology, one must ontologically analyse what creating and using an artefact or a technological device amounts to. Using technology is a complex phenomenon that cannot be properly analysed through the subject-object dichotomy in which an active autonomous subject employs an inert isolate material object to realize his purpose. Such an analysis presents the outcomes of actions as independent of the artefacts used, as if the same relations between subjects exist in a technological society as in a pre-technological society. In addition, designing an artefact does not mean only assembling material pieces according to certain spatial dispositions but also prescribing standard uses which imply moral, social, political, and economic values. The post-phenomenological analysis of Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek emphasize three main properties of artefacts that characterize the human-technology interactions: the multistability, the mediating role and the intentionality of artefacts. These features of artefacts take into account the role of technological devices in shaping the outcomes of human actions. An artefact can be used in more than one way and it can have more than one function (multistability). In addition, the use of an artefact modifies human action according to its design (mediation). In the process of using, the artefact orients and shapes human actions and decisions (intentionality of artefacts). Furthermore, as actor-network theory shows, technology is not a matter of private human-technology interactions, of individual usages, but of technological practices in socio-technological networks. In consequence, I propose to analyse technology as a rule-governed practice in the framework of Wittgenstein's fundamental grammar. Based on these two theoretical frameworks, post-phenomenology and grammatical analysis, we are able to assess the moral agency of artefacts, how technological practices are morally embedded, and to propose a normative ethics of technology that takes into account artefactual agency.


1. The Multistability of Technology
When a certain device is used, there are some particular actions that can be taken, some specific functions that this device have. For example, the earliest cellular telephones were devices designed only to call a certain other telephone for having a conversation. It was not intended to be used for any other purpose. When these devices became widely available, its users developed a new and unforeseen function, namely the transmission of written short text messages. There are of course some preconditions for doing that. First, the medium of transmission has to be digital so that the text encoding to be possible. In older normal telephones, the transmission of sound is analogical and that makes text encoding almost impossible. Second, the transmission of text messages is possible only between two such digital devices, because an analogical phone cannot receive nor display texts. The moral of this example is that a certain device with well-established functions can be employed for new uses. That is what makes a device multistable: the cellular telephone is, at one moment in time, an artefact with the well-established function of calling another phone, and, at another moment, it is an artefact with a totally different but stable function of transmitting text messages.

[...]

2. Technological Mediation
The other important characteristic of technological devices is the mediating role that they play in human-world interactions. What instrument one uses determines what actions that person does. The instrument is not just an inert, indifferent and transparent medium of our intentions. “The central idea in this approach is that technologies play an actively mediating role in the relations between human beings and reality.” (Verbeek, 2006: 119)

[...]


4. The Grammar of Technology
The three characteristics of technological devices analysed – multistability, mediation, and intentionality – show that artefacts are multistable objects that shape human actions and decisions according to proper technological possibilities. This post-phenomenological description of technology explains the possible forms of technological interactions. The possibilities revealed by the phenomenological description are constrained in the actual use by specific rules of using, functioning and development of technological devices. The technological mediated perception and practice take place in an intersubjective normative world. The technological practices, similar with language and experience, are neither isolate nor private facts but are subject to intersubjective rules (Mulhall, 2007). The intersubjective world is not composed only of humans and their interactions but also by artefacts and the interactions with them and the rules that norm these practices. According to Latour (2005), the intersubjective world is a collective of humans and non-humans organized in accord with internal rules of interactions. Post-phenomenology can accurately describe technological uses, technological interactions at individual level. Nevertheless, in order to give an account of the technological practices, uses employed over and over again, the analysis should be supplemented by taking into consideration the intersubjective rules of practice, the basic structure of use, that constrain individual uses. Consequently, technology will be analysed as a set of rule-governed practices. The rules of technological practices constitute a fundamental grammar of technology. “Fundamental grammar as Wittgenstein analyse it does not concern only word use but also the basic structures of use, practice, and the role of (not only linguistic) entities in a language game.” (Glock, 1996: 154)
Technology is a 'form of life' subjected to the rules of practice. The importance of these rules is that they prescribe at a certain moment of time what aspects can be seen, how devices can be used. The grammatical rules are the background that make certain aspects available and forbid certain uses4. A grammatical analysis of technology constrains multistability, mediation and technological intentionality but also corroborate them into rule-governed practices.
Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar is not an analysis of true and false sentences but an analysis of meaningful practices and their rules. As such, a grammar of technology has to analyse the rules that norm technological practice. The grammar of technology is not a set of everlasting logical laws, but an open set of arbitrary rules that apply to technological practices. The rules are arbitrary in the sense that they cannot be justified. In addition, they are arbitrary in the sense that they can be changed, as in the case of the dawning of new aspects. Otherwise, these rules are necessary and provide a deterministic background against which technological practice take place. In his Wittgenstein on the arbitrariness of grammar, Forster synthesizes the functioning of grammatical rules:
(1) Grammatical principles always have alternatives (the “diversity thesis”). (2) There is never any possibility of justifying or refuting grammatical principles (in their competition with alternatives). (3) Grammatical principles are neither correct nor incorrect, neither true nor false. (4) The factual claims that are made possible by one grammar never outdo those that are made possible by another, alternative grammar in virtue of being able to capture reality as the latter cannot, or being able to capture it more accurately than the latter. (65) … According to Wittgenstein, one is normally constrained to a particular range of grammars, or even to a particular grammar, in exclusion of possible alternatives, either by one’s very human nature or by one’s upbringing within specific social practices and traditions, so that adopting the particular range of grammars, or grammar, in question is not a matter of choice or decision for one in any usual sense of these words. (Forster, 2004: 67)
The main aspect that I want to emphasize is the possibility of grammatical change, the change in our technological practices that is driven by grammatical rules that are in certain aspects vague or fluid. The rule of practising an artefact prescribes how an artefact must be used. Nevertheless, rules are subject to interpretation. There are possible variations on how to apply the rule. Both rule-following and rule-change are based on the familiarity of use, on the “tacit knowledge” (Gill, 2008) one employs in using an artefact. The fact that one is familiar with the use of some object creates the possibility of aspect variation. These variations are the basis for the creation of new rules. Seeing the mobile phone as having yet another function requires new rules for using its new function. Seeing the cellular telephone as text messages sending device created an entire set of rules that governed the practice of sending short text messages. Being familiar within a grammar means also that certain unfamiliar features can be seen. A grammatical approach to technology also shows that while a new aspect, a new function of an artefact becomes apparent it does not necessarily become a technological practice because this would require a community of users that usually use that function. Employing a grammatical approach to technology allow us to a form of mild holism in the sense that one practice and its rules influence adjacent practices and their rules. The practice of sending text messages on cellular telephones modifies the practice of marketing and demanded the reshape of advertising content. Another important characteristic of grammatical rules is that they are embedded with ethical prescriptions of use. If a person does not respond to calls on a cellular telephone, there are some limits to the number of consecutive unanswered calls one may make because there is a record of them. For an analogical telephone, there were no such constraints because it was not possible to know whose call one missed.


5. Morality of Technological Practices
Using artefacts is a familiar activity, based on grammatical rules of practice, in which the artefacts are not mere objects but mediators and co-creators of human action. The modern ontology rejects the above-mentioned agency of artefacts. The reduction of artefacts to mere inert objects is analysed by Axel Honneth as the process of reification in which agency and morality is an exclusive property of subjects: “modern philosophy is doomed to run constantly into irresolvable antinomies, because it is rooted in reified everyday culture and thus remains entrapped within the subject-object opposition.” (Honneth, 2008: 29) The reification of artefacts, their reduction to inert instruments, is a structural mistake. “If reification constitutes neither a mere epistemic category mistake nor a form of moral misconduct, the only remaining possibility is that it be conceived as a form of praxis that is structurally false.” (Honneth, 2008: 26) This structural mistake is the fact that the mediating role of artefacts, which, as we see, shape human actions and decision, is considered morally neutral. This is one of the Heideggerian criticisms to the understating of modern technology. Heidegger, as well as contemporary philosophy of technology, shows that technology is not morally neutral. The artefacts are embedded with values and norms. The rules of practice of artefacts contain the moral standards that apply to that practice. An ethical approach to technology should recognize that using technological devices is morally embedded. The fact that technology mediates and shapes human actions and decisions means that technology has an important ethical impact on these actions and decisions. Therefore, a new form of ethics has to be created, one that considers not only the autonomous human subjects as relevant to ethical debates, but also the technological mediations and the technological rules of practice that shape ethical actions and decisions. Based on technological intentionality, on the fact that human-technology interactions give raise to decisions and actions not reducible to the human agent, the moral agency of these technological mediated situations cannot be reduced to human morality. Consequently, one should take into consideration, in formulating an ethics of technology, the ethical implications of technological mediations, the active role that artefacts play in decision-making and acting.
Ethics appears to be at the eve of a new Copernican revolution. A few centuries ago, the Enlightenment, with Kant as its major representative, brought about a turnover hitherto unequaled by moving the source of morality from God to humans. But currently there seem to be good reasons to move the source of morality one place further. It increasingly becomes clear that we should not consider morality as a solely human affair, but also as a matter of things. Just like human beings, material objects appear to be able to provide answers to moral questions. The artifacts we deal with in our daily lives help to determine our actions and decisions in myriad ways. And answering the question how to act is the ethical activity par excellence. (Vebeek, 2006: 117)
On the one hand, the artefacts' morality arises from the multistable mediation by which technology shapes actions and decisions. On the other hand, the ethical dimension of designing and using artefacts is subject to the rules of practice that establish what is a standard use and that contain ethical prescriptions of using an artefact.
The morality of artefacts is embedded in their specific rules of use and these ethical norms are transmitted as tacit knowledge together with the skill of using that artefact. As we show, these rules change in unforeseen ways according to grammatical patterns that cannot be controlled. The grammatical rules do not seem to be subjected to rational control. That means that a grammatical approach to the ethics of technology seems to be no more than a descriptive theory that expose the rules of practices and show how they work. There are even strong claims against a normative ethical approach to grammatical rules because there are no external-to-grammar standards (ethical, epistemic, etc.) to justify, judge or regulate technological practices and grammatical rules.
In sum, it seems that none of the available strategies for justifying grammatical principles (over against alternatives) can work—not justification in terms of truth-in-virtue-of-meaning, nor justification by the facts, nor justification in terms of success in realizing purposes, nor justification by deduction from more fundamental grammatical principles. (Forster, 2004: 46)
In the same manner, post-phenomenology restricts itself to a descriptive theory of technological mediations and their moral impact. The rationale for this restriction is the fact that during human-technological interactions technology mediates in unforeseen ways actions and decisions such that one cannot a priori asses the consequences of technological mediations.
Despite these internal restrictions for justifying, judging or regulating technological mediations and rules of technological practice, a normative ethical approach to technology is possible. If there are multiple paths of technological development, some of them can be promoted and the mediating role of future possible developments can be analysed.
[A] way to augment the ethics of technology with the approach of technological mediation is to assess mediations, and to try to help shape them. Rather than working from an external standpoint vis-à-vis technology, aiming at rejecting or accepting new technologies, the ethics of technology should aim to accompany technological developments (Hottois), experimenting with mediations and finding ways to discuss and assess how one might deal with these mediations, and what kinds of living-with-technology are to be preferred. (Verbeek, 2008: 101)
In addition, the immanent morality of the rules of technological practice and the impact of rule-changes on other practices can be evaluated and the practices can be shaped. If some rules of a grammar amount to self-destruction, to bad practices, then we have to reject those rules as structurally inadequate. This kind of normative ethics will not determine what is right or wrong, what is good or bad, and what is true or false, but what is structurally adequate or not in a certain technological practice. In the light of the conceptual framework employed above – multistability, mediation, technological intentionality and rule-governed practice –, there are possible ethical prescriptions for the design and practice of technological artefacts.
An important consequence of this grammatical and post-phenomenological approach is that a normative ethics of technology cannot be an a priori ethics. The ethical expertise should take and internal standpoint by a continuous evaluation of technological practices and mediations and a continuous promotions of adequate practices and mediations. In addition, the standards on which the mediations and practices are evaluated and promoted are to be internal to the technological practice and to consider the entire technological context. As Albert Borgmann (1984) shows, to promote a technological practice only on the basis that it facilitate an easiest and more pleasant life seems to be inadequate. He exemplifies this with microwave oven that, while make the meal preparation easiest, it promotes junk food consumption and conduces to a bad health and standardized meals. This mild holistic approach requires designing meaningful artefacts and to meaningfully appropriate the technological practices into everyday life such that different practices do not contradict each other.
A grammatical ethics of technology aims at promoting a sustainable technological practice and the design of meaningful technological devices. The grammatical ethics of technology is not the application of classical ethics to a new domain but the creation of a new ethics that take the acts of artefacts into consideration. Accordingly, this ethics is mainly an a posteriori endeavour that “accompany technological developments” and “experiment with mediations”, evaluating possible developments.
If the mediating role of technology is acknowledged, then the ethics of technology should involve in designing the material environment for moral action, i.e. the moral philosopher should became a technological designer:
When artifacts have moral relevance and embody a specific form of moral agency, ethics cannot only occupy itself with developing conceptual frameworks for moral reflection, but should also engage in the development of the material environments that helps to form moral action and decision-making. (Verbeek, 2008: 101)
This engagement in developing material environments for moral actions means that the technological design should enhance user's responsibility for its technological practices. The orientation towards practice means that technological practices become focal points of ethical discourse and the user of technology should be responsible for his practice. This responsibility enhancement means that artefacts should make apparent the consequences of one's technological practices as well as the possible implications for related practices. The device should be transparent in its functioning, to make apparent what it does and how it does. This transparency is not similar with Heideggerian technological transparency that meant that during practice the artefact disappeared from user's attention. On the contrary, the device should always make the user aware of its functioning and its consequences.
Along with responsibility towards technological practices, the design should also enhance multistable practices, i.e. the device should facilitate creative uses and various paths of action. Another requirement for a sustainable design is the enhancement of mediation possibilities by designing devices that can be easily integrated into human practices, devices that can be easily embodied by its users. In addition, the intentionality of artefacts, their ability to shape one's actions may be enhanced by designing not opaque material objects but partners for human actions.


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1Don Ihde builds on the results of gestalt theory, psychology of perception and phenomenological analyses of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. What makes his analysis post-phenomenological is the claim that the different aspects, stabilities, are not variations of the same object but totally different objects occasioned by the same multistable configuration. The other strong claim of post-phenomenology is the rejection of transcendental ego. “Multistability, in effect, replaces the notion of 'essences' in classical phenomenology, just as embodiment replaces the notion of 'subjectivity' in classical phenomenology.” (Ihde, 2006: 288).
2For an extensive analysis of the Background, see Searle, 1995, pp. 132-137.
3Wittgenstein speaks in this context of aspect-blindness, the incapacity to see aspects. Severin Schroeder affirms that a complete aspect-blindness is in fact impossible and the incapacity to see aspects is the lack of the appropriate emotional response in certain situations.
4Some uses, while technologically available, will never become practices, like, for example, complete facial hair removal for men, although majority of them shave daily all their life.